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In this article, we present some major lessons drawn from a recently completed research project. 
Our research dealt with ex-ante evaluation, mainly impact assessment (IA). We shed new light on 
research questions about the control of bureaucracy, the role of IA in decision-making, economics 
and policy learning, and the narrative dimension of appraisal. We identify how our findings stand in 
relation to conventional arguments about these issues, and reflect on their normative implications. 
We finally reason on the possible extensions of our arguments to the wider field of policy evaluation, 
connecting IA and ex-post evaluation. 
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In the late 1990s, the rare studies of ex-ante policy evaluation found it difficult to report 
on any concrete development within the European Commission outside financial planning 
and the structural funds. Take for example Pelkmans, Labory, Majone
2
 who were unable to 
report on the number of fiches d’impact (the instrument used at the time to appraise the 
likely effects of policy proposals of the Commission), what they contained, and who was 
using them. But today this topic has gained a stable place on the research agenda of social 
scientists, for example in political science
3
 and law.
4
 As Smismans’ notes in the introduction 
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to this volume,
5
 nowadays research on ex-ante policy appraisal falls within the wider field of 
policy evaluation, broadly defined to cover the whole policy cycle – from ex-ante analysis to 
ex-post appraisal. On this core idea, the European Union (EU) is in synch with the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD has recently 
adopted an integrated framework for policy evaluation
6
 where several concepts and even 
indicators developed in the practice of ex-ante assessment are transferred to ex-post 
analysis, with the aim of encouraging a common evaluative approach to regulation and 
legislation more generally. 
This reflects the politics of attention in regulatory evaluation: in the 1990s, only a 
few Member States were pushing a reluctant Commission to activate systematic initiatives 
for the integrated appraisal of EU legislation, be it ex-ante or ex-post. These years witnessed 
the emergence of the concepts of business impact assessment, compliance cost 
measurement, and better law-making, but there was no integrated response from the EU 
institutions.
7
 Radaelli reviewed in 1999 the initiatives for ex-ante evaluation of policy 
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proposals (excluding structural funds and financial planning) and concluded that the various 
pilot initiatives with policy instruments had not produced an integrated template and a 
coherent instrumentation – much ado about nothing.
8
 
Now there is a full range of initiatives for policy evaluation in the so-called smart 
regulation agenda of the EU and in the Member States. This evaluation turn has affected 
policy-makers’ understandings of the nature of EU law and its role in larger architectures for 
integrating policy and law, as shown by Smismans.
9
 Even the language and the labels used 
by policy-makers accompany this rise in attention – alongside the by-now traditional impact 
assessment of legislative and non-legislative proposals of the European Commission, we see 
an emerging policy agenda concerned with ex-post evaluation and post-implementation 
review, including projects to re-fit European legislation to changing structural conditions
10
 
and carry out ex-post evaluations.
11
 The attention for the problems created by 
administrative obligations has remained high since 2004, with several ‘wars’ on red tape 
endorsed by successive EU presidencies, the Commission, and stakeholders.
12
 All this 
activity is supposed to connect with the more established tradition of evaluation of 
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expenditure programmes, to create a coherent evaluation culture across EU institutions – 
this, at least, is the stated aim of the Commission. 
In short, a neglected issue has become familiar territory for researchers and policy-
makers. The year 2002 signals the moment when the Commission took the commitment to 
use a single integrated template (Impact Assessment, IA) to evaluate new proposals (beyond 
what was already done for expenditure programmes), to implement common standards for 
consultation, and to articulate an action plan for better regulation.
13
 After almost fifteen 
years, researchers have sufficient evidence to review the experience with ex-ante 
evaluation and IA in particular. We undertake this task by drawing lessons from a four-year 
project on Analysis of Learning in Regulatory Governance,
14
 funded by the European 
Research Council. In this contribution, we focus on some important conceptual findings 
rather than data on individual policy instruments or episodes to contribute to the research 
questions on policy evaluations that inform our special issue. Consequently, we will draw on 
a number of articles produced within ALREG – the reader can find evidence and data therein 
– and concentrate on the conceptual lessons. In the remainder, our main concern is the EU 
level, but when necessary we add observations on the situation is the Member States, since 
the two levels co-exist and interact. In the conclusions we elaborate on the implications of 
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our lessons for a critical research agenda in this field
15
 and for our wider theoretical 
understanding of the politics of bureaucracy, learning and diffusion of policy instruments. 
 
I. What is impact assessment for? 
1. Control instrument, tool of bureaucratic empowerment or just a symbol? 
At the outset, any appraisal of the experience with IA and smart regulation in the EU has 
to start with a theoretical proposition about the rationale for policy adoption.
16
 This 
rationale lies in delegation theory. The original intuition by McCubbins, Noll and Weingast
17
 
was that by saddling United States (US) agencies with formal obligations to carry out and 
publish regulatory analysis, information asymmetry would be reduced, taking the 
informational advantage away from the agency. Ex-post evaluation follows a similar control 
rationale, although to intervene on an agency when the policy programme is evaluated may 
be too late. Early warnings via administrative procedures during the drafting process, in 
contrast, are effective because they capture an agency’s deviation ‘prior to the agency’s 
implementation of a change in policy’.
18
 Damonte, Dunlop and Radaelli
19
 generalise this 
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argument to all instruments based on a fire-alarm logic: regulatory analysis is a fire alarm 
instrument that affected interests can pull at an early stage when a regulatory proposal 
damages them. IA enfranchises these interests and gives a voice to affected industries, 
constituencies of support for the elected politicians, and experts like economists, so that 
bureaucratic drift is limited.
20
 
Indeed, much of the US literature on IA stems from this rationale, with questions on the 
nature of control exercised by the Office for Information and Regulatory Analysis (OIRA) on 
federal executive agencies.
21
 Other US projects have looked at the different ways in which 
bureaucratic control can be effectively exercised by pressure groups.
22
 
Briefly, it has become customary to think of evaluation, especially in IA, as policy 
instrument for the control of bureaucracy. The Commission being a bureaucracy, the 
extension to the European case seems straightforward. But, is it? Indeed, when our team 
probed the different implications of the control argument in Europe, the findings have been 
less supportive of the control thesis. IA can be quite blunt as instrument of control of the 
Commission – and, turning to the domestic level, in some Member States like Denmark and 
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Sweden there isn’t evidence for the classic manifestations of bureaucratic control.
23
 In 
another ALREG paper, Radaelli and Meuwese
24
 conclude that IA has increased capacity for 
operational and strategic management within the Commission, thus effectively empowering 
the bureaucracy, rather than controlling it. Other projects have shown that IA in some EU 
Member States has symbolic properties – a veneer of rationality on a thick web of informal 
decision-making procedures and policy formulation conventions, hardly affected by the 
formal requirements of ex-ante appraisal.
25
 For some Member States, the issue is most 
likely the absence of analytical and institutional capacity.
26
 Without capacity, the whole idea 
of using detailed information to control bureaucracies via fire-alarm instruments cannot 
possible work. 
All this leads us to conclude that we might have been inspired by the wrong theory: 
control may be a correct lens for the US, but in Europe either there is little capacity to 
control, or, simply, control is not the main effect of implementation. Arguably, 
bureaucracies like the Commission are empowered by IA, whilst national bureaucracies use 
IA as signal and symbol when they do not have analytical capacity to manage this policy 
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instrument. Normatively, the empowerment effect may or may not be desirable. It is 
desirable if we think that accountability in multi-level systems needs high bureaucratic 
capacity rather than weak bureaucratic organisations. It is not desirable if we think that an 
empowered European Commission can make regulatory trade-offs disguised as technical 
management rather than discussed in terms of constitutional values – an issue that is 
explored in Radaelli and Meuwese.
27
 
 
2. An instrument for decision-making processes? 
A second finding we wish to discuss concerns the role of IA in decision-making 
processes. The guidelines on IA published by the member states and the Commission 
present IA as ex-ante evaluation tool that supports the decision-making process. In a recent 
resolution, the European Parliament
28
 reiterated this position arguing it is “convinced that 
IAs are an important means of supporting the decision-making in all EU institutions and an 
important part of the better regulation process; recognises, nevertheless, that IAs cannot be 
substitutes for political evaluation and decisions”. Put differently, IA should assist the final 
decision on a proposal – that is, the decision taken by the College of the Commission, but 
also decisions concerning substantive amendments to draft legislation introduced by the EP 
and the Council. The European Parliament lamented that the scope of IA may no longer 
mirror the proposals adopted when these proposals are altered at a final stage once 
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submitted for approval by the College. The EP therefore requested in its resolution “that the 
IA should be updated to ensure continuity between matters considered in it and any 
proposals finally adopted by the Commission”.
29
 The relationship with decision-making is 
slightly ambiguous, because to update an IA, in practice, may mean to retrofit ex-ante 
evaluation to match the political decision taken by the College – as well as the more benign 
but arguably unrealistic interpretation of carrying out new analysis to check if the final 
political decision still delivers net benefits. 
The College of Commissioners is not supposed to react mechanically to the 
conclusions of an IA, and reject or support a proposal automatically. The same principle 
applies to the EP and the Council when substantive amendments are introduced. But 
neither are Commissioners, MEPs and Council officers supposed to simply take note of the 
IA and treat it as one of the many inputs to decision-making. In short, the decisional value of 
IA has captured the attention of policy-makers. This is the reason why stakeholders lament 
that very few IAs conclude with a rejection of a possible policy intervention by the 
Commission. The average IA does not challenge the ‘priors’ of the Commission – this is the 
polemical claim – but supports them. The European Parliament in the Niebler report
30
 
complained that there is insufficient oversight of the IAs of the Commission. This is because 
the oversight body (the Impact Assessment Board) is made up of high-level Commission 
officers and is staffed by the Secretariat General – indeed the Juncker Commission signalled 
its intention to open up the board to external expertise.
31
 Overall, these critical opinions 
                                                          
29
 Ibid., point 8. 
30
 European Parliament Report on Guaranteeing Independent Impact Assessments, Committee on 
Legal Affairs A7-0159/2011. 
31
 See European Commission Press Release “President Juncker appoints Dr Edmund Stoiber Special 
Adviser for Better Regulation; First Vice-President Timmermans announces reform of the Impact 
 10
claim that the IA ought to be a strong tool for decision-making, but in the real world it may 
be used exclusively to support a given policy choice. 
Empirical evidence sheds different light on the decisional value of IA. Ex-ante 
evaluation is not necessarily used to ‘speak the truth to power’ – shown the case studies in 
Meuwese’s project.
32
 In our project, we found that the IA is not a decisional tool, but its role 
can be to lay out the evidence-based case for a certain policy preference of the 
Commission.
33
 This preference is not necessarily the output of IA. It can be pre-defined, or it 
can come out of last minute discussions within the College. And yet, IA still improves policy 
choice – even if it does not identify what this choice should be. The improvement consists of 
empirical analyses of the effects of the choice, on how the chosen option can be modulated 
across time and sectors, and on the deeper consideration of administrative compliance 
costs and implementation problems. Consultation reveals new issues to be taken on board. 
Importantly, the process of carrying out an IA obliges the Commission to give 
empirical and conceptual reasons for policy choice – whether the Commission would have 
gone for the same choice with our without IA is not the fundamental issue. 
Indeed this argument does not mean that the IA has limited usage. The IA has an 
effect after its publication, that is, post-decision. After its publication, the IA has a post-
decisional role when it is used by the EP or later in the process by the European Court of 
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Justice.
34
 Majone
35
 has shown the various effects of post-decisional analysis, exactly 
mentioning the use in Courts among others. It is also realistic to consider what the IAs of the 
Commission are about: on average, they are not about ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decisions like ‘shall we 
regulate the environmental consequences of steel production or not’ – they are about the 
mode, timing and details of a certain design of policies that have been elaborated via 
studies, working parties and other preparatory activities through the years. 
Although we argue that the ‘yes/no’ straightforward decisional role is weak, there 
are effects on the Commission’s decisional process that seem empirically important. 
Consider the following. Within the Commission, the preparation of IAs has made policy 
formulation more complicated than before. The IA steering groups of the Commission 
include all the Directorates General affected by a proposal plus the Secretariat General with 
a co-ordination role. IA as process has brought more actors into the process of preparing 
policy proposal. In an article by Radaelli and Meuwese
36
 we argued that the preparation of 
IAs has limited the silos mentality of the past. It forces the different interests represented by 
the officers (from different DGs) involved in the IA steering groups to dialogue and 
coordinate, using evidence-based argumentation.
37
 Thus, in a sense, making things 
complicated is a virtue of IA because it allows the Commission to exploit the benefits of 
partisan mutual adjustment. Evidence-based bargaining within the Commission’s units 
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working in the IA steering groups is a way to learn from information brought into the policy 
process by officers with different policy preferences and interests.
38
 To conclude, our 
project provides content to the ambiguous proposition that the IA should support decisions 
without being a substitute for political decision-makings. Its supporting role is about 
improving the quality of the policy formulation process within the Commission via partisan 
mutual adjustment and, beyond the Commission, in post-decisional analysis. 
 
II. How ‘good’ is impact assessment? 
1. Economics logic and modes of learning 
How ‘good’ is a policy instrument? There are different answers to this question. In 
the case of ex-ante evaluation, we can consider different criteria such as whether the IA is 
used by decision-makers and stakeholders
39
 or carries out the tests prescribed in the 
guidelines.
40
 More fundamentally, we can raise issues about the robustness of the 
underlying rationale – the intrinsic social scientific robustness of a given policy instrument 
for evaluation. The literature on policy instruments
41
 argues that the instruments adopted 
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by governments are carriers of specific economic ideas or economic theories. There is no 
doubt that economics is the main rationale evoked in the literature on ex-ante policy 
formulation. Actually it is exactly for this reason – that is, IA as vehicle of specific economic 
lenses on a wide range of policy issues – that ex-ante appraisal has been criticized by those 
who oppose the economic quantification of environmental issues, human rights and other 
types of policy problems.
42
 
We suggest a different interpretation. True, policy instruments are carriers of 
economic ideas. But they also carry a view of the world which public managers face: this 
world can be a world of rational-synoptic agents, that scan a high number of options root-
and-branches until the find the most efficient one, or a world of bounded rationality. Thus, 
alongside an economic worldview, policy instruments also contain a set of assumptions 
about how public managers learn from evidence. 
In Coletti and Radaelli
43
 we follow this dual approach (economic ideas and 
assumptions about learning) and argue that a given regulatory instrument contains both an 
economic rationale and a learning model, or a ‘logic’ of how and what constellations of 
actors learn by using the instrument. We then examine IA and the Standard Cost Model 
(SCM) used for the identification of the costs of administrative obligations.
44
 They are both 
used in policy formulation at the EU level, whilst some member states carry out ex-ante 
evaluation with the SCM but do not engage with the wider IA. If we look only at the 
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economic robustness of the two instruments, IA should always be preferred to the SCM. The 
latter is concentrated on a narrow category of costs,
45
 it does not look at benefits, and may 
lead to inefficient policy choices – simply put, economically wrong evaluations of option. 
However, if we flip the coin and consider the robustness of the two policy instruments in 
terms of their learning models, the conclusion changes. Economically rudimentary forms of 
appraisals like the SCM contain more realistic and effective learning models than IA. In 
Coletti and Radaelli
46
 we explain how the SCM has triggered learning processes in some 
member states, leading to approaches to map the regulatory process from the point of view 
of the stakeholders, to the inclusion in regulatory reform programmes of stakeholders who 
had been at the margin until now, to stronger linkages between ICT initiatives in the public 
sector and regulatory reform, and to the consideration of wider compliance costs. The 
conclusion is straightforward: when we discuss whether an instrument for policy evaluation 
will work or not, we should consider both the robustness of its underlying economic ideas 
and its assumptions about learning and rationality. 
 
2. The narrative components 
 
Another way of looking at why regulators write IAs is to think about policies as 
theories.
47
 A policy proposal is a set of hypothesis about cause-and-effect relations. It 
follows that IA is the place where these cause-and-effect relations are spelled out. In other 
words, the IA portrays the causal structure of a given policy proposal. Since they are used to 
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make the case for a given proposal, IAs are more than repositories of empirical evidence. 
They are not review essays. Their role is to coordinate discourse within the Commission, 
where the IA steering groups, as explained above, engage in partisan mutual adjustment; 
and to communicate to the broader public of MEPs, Council working groups, stakeholders 
and delegates from the Member States. The IAs have a persuasion function and are written 
with specific readers over the shoulders of the Commission’s officers. 
These considerations invite a novel exploration of IA by adopting the tools and 
methods of discourse analysis. Given their causal structure (‘we have to do X to reach Y 
because X will produce this and that effect leading to Y’), IA can be studied as causal 
narratives of public policy. We followed this approach in Radaelli, Dunlop and Fritsch.
48
 We 
found that not only do the IAs contain ‘policies as theories’ and often engage with policy 
narratives. This role of the Commission as ‘narrator’ had not been explored in the past, 
although the use of IA as communication and persuasion tool features prominently in our 
own discussions and interviews with policy-makers. Experiments in behavioural economics 
point to the importance of social trust in the narrator.
49
 Given the current state of trust in 
EU institutions and the credibility issues surrounding the Juncker Commission, it seems risky 
(for the Commission) to engage in ‘grand narratives’ and evoke value. And identities too, 
e.g. who ‘Europeans’ are, what the nature of the Commission is, who is better placed to do 
what in relation to a given policy issue. And yet, our analysis shows that IAs are used to 
reiterate issues of identity and values that, although they may appear already in the Treaty, 
are taken to their narrative conclusions in the IA. In our sample, we found several 
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propositions about what ‘European values’ are and what ought to be in the EU and beyond. 
The fact that values and identities are developed within bureaucratic documents like the IAs 
and not in constitutional discussions may be disturbing normatively. Pragmatically, it signals 
a recurrent problem with the behaviour of the Commission already spotted by Laura 
Cram:
50
 when trust and credibility are low, the Commission does not go back to its core 
business and show concrete results. Instead, it tends to scale up in ambition and engage 
with grandiose narratives of ‘governance’. Viewed in this light, the narrative features of IA 
may be part of a bigger problem. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
In this article, we have reflected on a number of major findings from our recent project. 
Whilst it is customary to think of IA as control instrument, our research suggests that this 
instrument may strengthen the bureaucracy in Brussels. We cannot say whether increased 
capacity for strategic and operational policy design and management within the Commission 
leads to autonomy and ‘escape from control’ – definitively we need more research on the 
usage of IAs by the EU institutions. In another article from our project,
51
 we have made the 
case for ‘equifinality’: different concatenations of variables lead to outcomes like ‘control’ 
and ‘learning’ – hence we need a nuanced perspective on these questions. 
We have also qualified the decisional role of IA. The latter contributes to the decision-
making process, but its merit over time is most likely to lay out arguments and evidence that 
can be used after the decision is taken, by the EP, Courts, stakeholders and perhaps the 
same bureaucracies that generates the original IA and go back to the same issue years later 
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in the context of another IA. To illustrate, the Commission has dealt with the issue of 
regulation of trade from seals’ fur in different regulatory interventions during the last ten 
years.
52
 
Further, we argued that IAs have a narrative function that accompanies, without 
necessarily substituting, the function of providing economic analysis of the proposals under 
consideration. This narrative function extends to identity building and the definition of 
values – something that may have desirable or undesirable normative implications 
depending on how we approach constitutional politics in the EU. Finally, in terms of policy 
design diffusion and international transfer, we have argued that best practices hinder 
instead of facilitating transfer and the social construction of lesson-drawing. The 
implementation and diffusion of IA is sensitive to the learning logic encapsulated in this 
policy instrument – another argument that rectifies our conventional views. 
Throughout the article, we have supported our modifications of propositions and 
interpretations that are quite diffuse in the debate on ex-ante evaluation – a sort of 
conventional wisdom. Thus, why did we find that the conventional interpretative lens may 
be wrong? One reason is the logic of scientific inquiry. The vast majority of research that 
defined the ‘theory’ of IA in the early days was produced by scholars with data from the US 
case. It is sensible to suggest that some conclusions drawn on the US case may not be valid 
when we consider Europe. What we thought was a general theoretical argument about IA 
was instead a local theory, valid only in certain places and times. 
Another reason is the role played by international organisations and policy-makers in 
distilling lessons and conventional propositions that assist their communication, the design 
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of guidance for IA, training and the diffusion of economic analysis in government and at the 
Commission. Because of these objectives (diffusion, training, communication, 
implementation), complex causal phenomena are reduced to simple propositions that can 
be somewhat ‘sloganized’. Some of them have intuitive value, like the logic of best practice, 
and are heuristically attractive. With this article we have shown the dangers of relying on 
assumptions that are not exposed to critical empirical and theoretical challenge. 
One question for the readers of this special issue is whether the arguments we aired can 
be extended to the ex-post evaluation of legislation. Obviously while the Commission has 
produced IAs for more than a decade, the experience of the Commission with legislative 
evaluation carried out ex-post is much more fragmentary and we lack a body of empirical 
research. We can only talk at the conceptual level. Conceptually, indeed, if appraisals 
strengthen the bureaucracy instead of controlling it, the argument could apply to both ex-
ante and ex-post. The observations about the decisional role of evaluations can extend to 
ex-post – the Commission may not use evaluations to terminate legislation but there may be 
other effects on the decisional process and post-decisional effects. The remarks on 
narration and best practice are conceptually transferrable to the ex-post phase of 
evaluation, and learning may impact on economic models’ usage both in the ex-ante and 
the ex-post case. Of course, this does not suggest any conclusion absent empirical analysis – 
but it invites an integrated research agenda for the whole life cycle of evaluation. 
 
